Dangerously Changing Inconvenient Rules

Have you ever noticed that whenever the Deep State/Democrats change inconvenient rules, which is often accompanied by a move to better and enhanced technologies, it creates a portal permitting rampant fraud?

Have you ever noticed that such rules changes are normally executed by executive order, which equates to unilateral decision making, which equates to tyranny?

What are the chances that then President Barack Obama would inherit an outgoing George W. Bush executive order (#13486) devised to overhaul U.S. biosecurity in its biocontainment facilities and by means of a hand-picked “working group?” Rhetorical question; the chances are 100%.

Is it possible that Obama changed the rules pertaining to biosecurity beginning immediately upon entering office in 2009?

Did Obama use a 2014 “security stand down” issued unilaterally by Lisa Monaco (Department of Homeland Security) to alter rules and protocols for the purpose of loosening U.S. biosecurity measures writ large and in advance of underpinning the off-shoring of gain of function research to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China beginning on a 2014 (halted research) – 2015 (off-shored and funded) timeline?

History helps answer these questions.

The nation’s most sensitive FISA rules (laws) were deliberately broken to spy on then candidate and later President Donald J. Trump along with other critical personnel under the Trump umbrella, like Lt. General Michael Flynn.

Impeachment rules were changed by Speaker Nancy Pelosi to reassign impeachment oversight from Jerry Nadler’s House Judiciary Committee – the lawful impeachment body – to Adam Schiff’s HPSCI; serving to further compartmentalize the fraudulent action within the treasonous intelligence community, which is essentially the spine to all of this corruption, treason and potential genocide (for the record, it’s actual; not potential, and the term ‘modern day holocaust’ is appropriate.)

State election rules (laws) were changed, broken or circumvented in multiple states to permit the theft of the 2020 election.

Elections rules (laws) were changed to ensure that precincts used preferred electronic voting machines that feature enhanced and better technologies like cellular modems, which can be leveraged by things like Hammer and Scorecard.

On 18 Mar 16 and with executive order Public Law 114-136, Obama changed longstanding presidential rules (law) by augmenting them to include pandemic preparedness; later inserting a political false flag construct (the COVID-19 pandemic) into the Trump administration during those same statutorily compulsory presidential transition meetings on 13 Jan 17.

So, again, I ask – Have you ever noticed that whenever the Deep State/Democrats change inconvenient rules, which is often accompanied by a move to better and enhanced technologies, it creates a portal permitting rampant fraud? This frames the basis of our long and intense discussion today.

In the same vein of rules changes and to recapitulate our premise, it appears that right from the very beginning of his first term in early 2009, Obama leveraged a biosecurity executive order inherited from an outgoing Bush (11 days before Obama’s inauguration) to make substantial rules changes in biosecurity writ large. Those changes eventually permitted the off-shoring of gain of function research relative to the SARS-CoV-2 virus to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China. It appears Obama then leveraged an apparent manufactured biosecurity crisis created by a DHS memo issued by Lisa Monaco in 2014 that cited three unrelated incidents as justification for issuing a national “security stand down” at U.S. biocontainment facilities, which created the entities and processes to make the rules changes. The Monaco memo coincides with internal U.S. whistleblowers who, on the same 2014 timeline, shined the light on U.S. gain of function research causing Obama’s administration to halt it and then, in 2015, off-shore it to China and fund it with Fauci’s NIH, et al.

THE BACKDROP

Here is contextual backdrop information for this work that explains the emergence of the U.S. into this bio-warfare dynamic and it should be understood for the rest of our discussion. It is extracted from a May 2009 Department of Defense report that we continue to examine throughout and which overlaps Obama’s first term.

Biological Select Agents and Toxins and Bio-Safety Level Laboratories: After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the anthrax letters mailed later that same year, Congress recognized the threat of terrorism and enacted the USA Patriot Act in 2001. The Patriot Act makes it illegal for an individual to possess BSATs for any reason other than bona fide research. The act states: “Whoever knowingly possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose.” In response to these events, DoD and the service Inspector General teams inspected DoD biological RDT&E laboratories and advocated development of a surety program for biological agents, similar to existing surety programs for nuclear and chemical programs. In 2002, Congress enacted the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act that tasked the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to prepare a list of select agents and toxins based on the criteria specified in the act; the current version of that list is found in Table 2 along with the associated bio-safety levels (BSL).

Taking it back even further, know that Phase I of this broader effort dates back to 1999 during Bill Clinton’s presidency and further, Hillary Clinton will bear down in this momentarily. The 1999 timeline abuts to the 2001 9/11 timeline, which is not coincidental or by accident.

Another important contextual backdrop item, of which there are too many to include, from the DoD report is that of all of the identified viable threats to biosecurity systems, the one posing the greatest threat is the “insider threat;” and not without a sense of irony, that is the precise threat that bears down in the fraudulent COVID-19 pandemic (emphasis mine).

There was general agreement that an insider could remove BSAT material without detection. However, there was also considerable skepticism that an insider could use a DoD laboratory to proceed with weaponization steps undetected, other than in cases where the planned legitimate work involved equipment or processes that might enable weaponization; in such cases, additional security measures and monitoring should be provided and carefully observed.

Attempting to manipulate large quantities of agents (or weaponization) with steps that require specific equipment (e.g., lyophilizers) is much more likely to arouse suspicion and be detected by an alert management. On the other hand, these further steps (weaponization and quantity) could be accomplished in a garage, basement, or a less-protected lab, such as in a school, with some risk to persons nearby. Any individual who intends to employ a pathogen as a weapon is unlikely to be inhibited from using makeshift facilities that lack the full suite of safety practices utilized by the biodefense labs.

Our focus is being narrowed to something called the “two-person rule” relative to video monitoring systems and other important safeguards. The narrow focus allows us to demonstrate what appears to be a broader fundamental and deliberate shift to move U.S. biocontainment facilities and the regulations and rules framing their handling of BSATs and their interactions with foreign facilities and individuals, in the direction of a less robust biosecurity system; not a more robust one.

Note that the report indicates that the “two-person rule,” which is expanded on below, is of higher cost relative to lower value. Throughout the reports we examined, there is a firm, consistent and detracting message representing an effort to move away from the two-person system, which makes for a second, knowledgeable and objectively impartial set of eyes in the lab at all times.

Why?

Why not move in the other direction and mandate both the 2-person system and the video system? Why not make it a 3-person system including an international representative?

Simple logic tells us that the 2-person system matched to other effective biosecurity measures enhances biosecurity but the underpinning philosophical approaches being ushered-in by Obama’s administration curiously cause for a less robust and more vulnerable biosecurity system.

Look around you and ask yourself if that was an accident?

This is from the same DoD report (emphasis mine),

Two-person Rule and Video Monitoring: The current view on thwarting an attempt to steal weaponizable BSATs is typically to apply a two-person rule for working in the lab. In addition, most labs have some degree of video monitoring with a bank of display screens at some central point (e.g., guard post). The two-person rule is considered onerous, and potentially dangerous as it requires someone other than the active scientist to be present in the lab. It is also costly in terms of dollars and personnel. The video monitor is typically thought of as a forensic tool after the fact, but in real time it is only a bank of screens occasionally observed by people who are not experts in lab techniques. Table 7 outlines some of the pros and cons of the two approaches. The task force judged neither approach to be effective as they are used today. Even as a forensic tool, the video is generally retained for short periods of time and the need for forensics may occur months or years after the theft.

Note how the 2-person rule is hammered with negative connotation and devalued relative to cost, which repeats in additional reports and documents as follows. In typical propaganda form, it’s also book-ended by a criticism of the video system they recommend and prefer; constituting the classic propaganda tactic mixing of info and disinfo.

In actuality, though, it’s more than that. I assume it’s also likely to be a specific weakness they intended to exploit in order to operate in darkness and with no one else to see – literally. It’s a simple as saying a 1-person system only has one set of real eyes in the lab.

With the backdrop in place – lets get into it.

WEAKENING BIOSECURITY

Our discussion begins with recent work revisiting the WIV as the origin of the fraudulent data-driven COVID-19 pandemic; especially since it’s resurfacing in the broader narrative and making Trump and then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (and the rest of us “conspiracy theorists” who have had this precisely dialed all along) appear as prognosticating geniuses (accurate intelligence helps.)

I’ve also recently summarily rehashed the COVID-19 construct to provide a succinct but thorough explanation of it; examined how China may leverage the pending U.S. infrastructure bill to apply Chinese doctrine to America; and I identified the Deep State/China/CCP exit plan from the attribution of the COVID-19 genesis to the Wuhan lab, which is manifesting as an emerging carve-out in the broader narrative.

Let’s start with James LeDuc from the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston; which is only about 55 or so miles from the now shuttered Chinese consulate in Houston that is known as a hotbed for Deep State/CCP activity and which was recently observed (last summer) burning documents on its rooftop. Notably, our reporting has previously covered how the UTMD was enmeshed in the COVID-19 pandemic in troubling ways.

It was LeDuc’s long-tenured relationships with the CDC, UTMB and Anthony Fauci; including being the recipient of substantial funding from Fauci, that when matched with his with his recommendation to examine the WIV using a pro-China narrative (that such a possibility is “less likely”) that is causing us to scrutinize him more closely.

LeDuc set us on this course and that work grew some legs; potentially long ones.

What really holds our attention with LeDuc is this – his advisement to upper echelon scientists in the area of biosecurity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in 2008 and as an overlap to Obama’s first term beginning in 2009; and emphasizing our position that Obama has been and continues to run point on all things and whereas Biden is his (and China’s/CCP’s) proxy in an otherwise shadow government (video below).

Beyond the philosophical shift to replace or diminish the 2-person system in favor of a fallible video system and the pitfalls inherent to that, there were other significant philosophical approaches being taken that also appeared to counter a robust biosecurity system.

Specifically, the philosophy of driving a “culture of responsibility” bearing down at the individual scientist level achieves a specific tactical and strategic purpose. It compartmentalizes biosecurity system within the individuals. That is important when you come to understand that individuals can be (have been) compromised and leveraged for nefarious reasons. Just ask Mike Pence. We’ll talk more about the Deep State vernacular always used to do this sort of thing.

I was able to identify 23 prior publications from LeDuc and I looked at several of them more closely. Our attention is drawn to one in particular that was authored in 2011 and it rests on his prior positions; including his 2008 advisement to the WIV, as I previously reported and noted. The co-authored piece is entitled ‘Balancing Our Approach to the Insider Threat.’

LeDuc’s introduction to this item should be consumed alongside my established position on the status quo, which is that 9/11 is a previous and sequential step with a bridge to COVID-19 and existing on a generational timeline. That said, LeDuc’s introduction to this item is unsurprising given that he’s of Fauci’s ilk.

First, here’s that description of the status quo, which exists in what I believe may be a divided government with the military recognizing Trump as president and the Judiciary and Congress recognizing Biden (because they helped install him.)

With confidence, it can be and has been demonstrated that individuals within the U.S., some with ties back to Nazi-era Germany (Bush family, et al.), conspired with China/CCP/PLA to research, fund, develop and then deploy a bio-WMD taking the form of SARS-CoV-2, which has genetic markers indicating four artificial HIV insertions and gain of function indicators, to exploit its previous deep and broad infiltration of the U.S. to remove its sitting president, overthrow its government, install a Chinese proxy (Biden) and destroy the nation from within by dividing its people with a fraudulent systemic racism campaign and by destroying its economy with a fraudulent pandemic; and all of it leverages treasonous politicians, officials and CEOs in the United States.

POLITICAL MOONSHINE

Here’s LeDuc’s ominous introduction to the piece (emphasis mine),

Bioterrorism was a concern of some in government even before Al Qaida–manned planes took down the World Trade Center towers. The anthrax letters greatly heightened that concern and extended it to our citizens as well. The nation responded with billions of dollars: bio- defense research and development, medical countermea- sures, equipment, training first responders, and funding construction of numerous high-containment laboratories. A next generation of scientists began working with what had been called, just since the mid-90s, ‘‘select agents’’; these were generally ‘‘high-risk’’ pathogens, including some that had been studied in state-sponsored biological warfare programs during the Cold War.

LeDuc’s co-authored piece would be foreboding (emphasis mine),

The commission’s report raised the risk of biological terrorism above nuclear terrorism and stated that the nation should ‘‘be more concerned that scientists will become terrorists than that terrorists will become scientists.’’ About the same time, Congressional testimony and concern in the science community resulted in 4 national level studies generally addressing what we now call ‘‘the insider threat’’ in biology.

The following quote is the initial aspect that fully caught my attention and set us on this course (emphasis mine),

A Defense Science Board study, Department of Defense Biological Safety and Security Program (May 2009), acknowledged the insider threat as a very difficult problem, noted that the Department of Defense had the most stringent laboratory security regulations, recommended laboratory video cameras in labs rather than a 2-person rule (1 person to watch another scientist at work), encouraged tailoring the Personnel Reliability Programs (PRP) in bio- logical labs to avoid having a negative impact on research, and underscored the importance of public awareness regarding risk reduction.
END QUOTE

Why is LeDuc recommending that this change be made and why did he provide the exact same recommendation to scientists at the WIV in 2008? Why did this overlap Obama’s first term?

For clarity, Obama’s presidency began following the noon inauguration on 20 Jan 09. For more clarity, understand that LeDuc is a Fauci lackey and that Fauci entered service under Reagan (George H.W. Bush was VPOTUS) in 1984. He – Fauci – bridges George H.W. Bush to Clinton to George W. Bush to Obama to Trump to Biden.

So, why does LeDuc put a robust biosecurity system in the backseat in favor of a fallible video system and why do they prefer to address ideological concerns such as “negative impact on research” or scientists being “negatively affected?” Are those appropriate priorities?

Wouldn’t a robust biosecurity system entail informing the scientists that they’re conducting arguably the world’s most sensitive and dangerous research and if they can’t handle the requisite rigors and strict protocols of an effective and robust biosecurity system because it causes them emotional, psychological or professional harm, then they are not qualified for the job.

Hire someone else. Problem solved – unless, of course, your goal is to have and leverage a problem you designed yourself.

The company line offered here by Obama’s administration is an excuse that such a robust system and its restrictive measures interfere with recruiting the best scientific talent. Does that mean that the best scientific talent prefers to work without stringent guardrails to protect against possible deliberate or otherwise but most certainly unethical catastrophes?

Or is it a measure pertaining to the “best” scientific talent being perhaps the scientific “talent” that is willing to engage in bio-weaponization and gain of function work?

Moving forward relative to the quotes that follow, study how the Deep State makes patently obvious policy decisions that equate to more lax biosecurity and then explains it all away with flowery academic language pulling on about any string that is not common sense, human nature or actual science (their favorite tactic.)

The following is a perfect example of how this Fauci cohort is using their own vernacular to compartmentalize biosecurity with individual scientists. Remember that an individual scientist can be leveraged and compromised much more effectively than an entire robust biosecurity system.

In this instance and as he makes his remarks, LeDuc is pulling from a report we’ll visit momentarily (emphasis mine) when he says, “…the importance of strong leadership and a culture of personal responsibility in laboratories.”

That small fragment is a driving force in the broader Obama biosecurity philosophy. They conveniently compartmentalize biosecurity in two specific ways: at 1) the laboratory level and 2) the level of the individual scientist. Do you see the parallel to election fraud, which similarly occurred at state and precinct levels?

This notion of compartmentalization can’t be overstated. Culpability for curating all of the COVID-19 infection and mortality data was compartmentalized with medical providers. Enforcement for COVID-19 mitigations and guidelines leveraged federalism to be compartmentalized at the state and local levels.

A great analog for compartmentalization can be found in cancer. Which is easier to remove? Cancer metastasized throughout the entire body or an individual tumor in an accessible location? Compartmentalization is critical.

Just like compartmentalization permitted the theft of the election at specific accessible locations, compartmentalizing the biosecurity system within the individual scientists and laboratory leadership, permits entities to compromise the entire U.S. system essentially undetected by leveraging specific accessible locations and individuals.

Consider the similarities with how China is now compartmentalizing the culpability for the genesis of COVID-19, which was actually a bio-WMD strike against the U.S., in a false narrative being constructed around faulty lab sloppiness.

LeDuc, Fauci, et al. are recommending policies that compartmentalize biosecurity arguably because it lends toward a more vulnerable system that is more easily (and deliberately) compromised.

Otherwise, can anyone explain the rationale behind moving off a more robust 2-person biosecurity system, which leverages an unaffiliated third-party scientist (and that scientist’s human conscience) as an objective and methodological surveillance procedure to personally monitor the activities of another scientist at any/all times when inside the lab; and especially so since they are doing the world’s most dangerous work?

Not I. There is not one iota of common sense that prevails there.

Why do teachers walk around the room and from behind, look over the shoulders of students as they take their tests? Rhetorical question.

Examine the following as to whether it is representative of robust biosecurity measures or Deep State, bureaucratic, nonsense vernacular that explains away actual biosecurity in favor of something intentionally and deliberately inadequate and vulnerable (emphasis mine)?

Finally, the National Academies of Science released a study, Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (September 2009), leading with the call for building a culture of trust, engaging stakeholders, requiring government inspectors to have technical and laboratory experience, and pointing out the futility of attempting to implement an overly stringent agent accountability program.

The reports from the science community, the National Academies of Science, and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, in particular, emphasized the importance of building a ‘‘culture of responsibility’’ and the value of leadership in making laboratories safe and the conduct of science responsible.

None of that is actual biosecurity but rather bullshit philosophical ideas about it. Once you know what to look for, finding it becomes relatively easy and here’s more (emphasis mine).

We have greatly increased security, installed cameras and stationed armed guards, and implemented PRPs at our government laboratories. We have implemented select agent rules—which have negatively affected our scientists’ ability to share microbial isolates with colleagues at collaborating facilities here and abroad—and we have required scientists to keep even more detailed records in an attempt to account for unmeasurable quantities of readily multiplying microbes. But what have we done to positively change the culture in our laboratories? We’ve done the easy part—the part that can be readily purchased or that lends itself to regulation and checklist management.

“Here and abroad?” Abroad, like China?

Does that translate to, “we are loosening up rules and protocols on sharing BSATs (SARS-CoV-2?) including sharing with overseas labs (China?).”

It even appears that they care for the reader to feel bad about it with those poor scientists being “negatively affected” and the concern for the “culture in our laboratories,” as if this is some liberal arts project on multiculturalism and race.

Here is more of the same flowery, bullshit vernacular angling for about anything other than a robust biosecurity system (emphasis mine).

We hear little of the value of ‘‘leadership’’ as a measure of safety and security in our select agent labs. Successful, enlightened leaders lead with quality science, an emphasis on safety, vision, education, responsibility, accountability, honesty, transparency, and ethics. From this, a culture of trust and accountability virtually always results. Regulatory oversight may call for varying levels of physical security, ‘‘lists’’ and pathogen controls, background checks and psychological evaluation of workers. These, without effective leadership, may only slow research progress and lead to a culture of frustration and mistrust.

“May call” for varying levels of physical security? “Individual responsibility?” It’s absolute tripe and by design. It’s garbage; bullshit as stated; talking out ones own ass; whatever you care to call it, which can be anything but effective and robust biosecurity.

Trust “always results? That is Deep State vernacular explaining away something they can’t control with an absolute – “always.” Red flag.

In this day, time and place, who in ones right mind blindly trusts the Chinese with bio-WMD proprietary knowledge and samples because of belief in ones own made-up “culture of responsibility?”

Fauci admitted he was essentially too lazy to vet his Chinese grant (think access) recipients against the CCP. He actually said that. How dumb does he think we are?

Having spared you several segments of LeDuc’s short piece, it ends with this (emphasis mine).

Our life science enterprise, ever more important to our nation’s well-being in this global economy, will never be risk free. Official biosecurity policy must include means of fostering enlightened leaders; with the leadership approach comes better science, better safety, and, we believe, even better security. Without it, the other measures be- come little more than the appearance of security. Troubled scientists have and will come to an engaged and enlightened leader for help, where openness has been built and trust is the currency. There are too little data to know if he or she will go to a ‘‘regulator’’ in a laboratory where trust is lacking.

“The appearance of security?” “Trust is lacking?

Nope. Rather, what’s lacking is the robust biosecurity system that would have prevented the FAUXVID-19 horse from ever leaving the barn.

Let’s focus more precisely and dial this down on Obama where in earlier reporting I previously remarked, “that is how Obama’s administration stopped (in 2014) and then off-shored and funded (in 2015) its gain of function research by sending it to the National Institute of Virology in Wuhan, China.”

It’s important to remember that the ONLY reason the Obama administration paused GOF research in 2014 is because several folks internally suddenly sprouted a conscience – the same human conscience that all of these recommendations are suggesting be eliminated from labs due to high cost and low value – and shined a light on it. Otherwise, they would have continued uninterrupted with GOF work in the U.S.

From our May 2009 Department of Defense Biological Safety and Security Program report, we note that it overlaps another Obama/DOD effort that was also begun in the same 2009 timeframe; and on the same treasonous political continuum. The latter Obama effort produced the U.S. landscape we see today and it was discussed in detail in a previous article, which describes Obama’s application of his counterinsurgency doctrine to America. It served to function as a blueprint framing the overthrow of a sitting president and the U.S. government, which is a practice perfected overseas by the U.S. military and intelligence communities (again, see Hammer and Scorecard.)

The DoD report begins with an ominous tone,

Based on a series of briefings and site visits, and the experience of task force members, the single overarching finding of this investigation is that a determined adversary cannot be prevented from obtaining very dangerous biological materials intended for nefarious purposes, if not from DoD laboratories, then from other sources. The nation needs to recognize this reality and be prepared to mitigate the effects of a biological attack. Today, we as a nation are not prepared.

The report contains two important pieces of information. For one,

Overseas regulations: Use Department of State background investigations for host country personnel working in BSAT labs outside the United States. Issue waiver authority so that laboratory commanders can determine appropriate security measures for shipments into these facilities.

Falling back on the apparent objective of loosening biosecurity and the tactic of compartmentalizing it individually, the compartmentalization is extended to “laboratory commanders” who have “waiver authority” relative to shipping BSATs (SARS-CoV-2?) to bio-containment facilities; including overseas facilities (China?).

Further, keep an eye out for the Department of State angles because in addition to the origins of the biosecurity shift drawing back to Bill Clinton’s presidency in 1999, at the time of this 2009 DoD report, the Secretary of State is none other than Hillary Clinton. We’ll discuss her in more detail below.

Relative to “overseas regulations,” remember that the NIH/Fauci were funding the WIV after off-shoring its gain of function research there in 2014-2015. In consideration of that, we continue to wonder if these 2009 DoD changes were devised to set the landscape to permit all of that? After all, they began in 1999 while Bill Clinton – as Commander in Chief – was steering the DoD and they were gifted to Obama by Bush’s EO with the expectation that Hillary would win in 2016.

The 2-person policy continues to bear down.

BSAT transport: Review the usefulness of the two-person rule in preventing insider threats. Use “lost in the crowd” approach for shipments into laboratories. And consider the potential use of flight safe, tamper-resistant shipping containers.

The DoD report provides more similar evidence of concern elaborating on the identified and primary “insider threat” (emphasis mine).

The insider threat dominates internal security concerns: An insider could probably transfer BSAT out of the facility or supply chain without being discovered, regardless of defensive countermeasures. One can only make it difficult and uncertain for the insider. Detection of an insider threat is difficult even with extensive monitoring of the emotional and mental state of BSAT-certified employees, including transport personnel.

Improved video monitoring of labs can be superior to the two-person rule for detecting or deterring nefarious activities in the lab and can be valuable in assuring good safety practices.

BSAT transport works well today using the “lost in the crowd” approach, and may be worse with a two-person rule.

These positions appear to be the foundation for the loosening of biosecurity rules and regulations; noting that the “lost in the crowd” approach in transporting BSATs to labs is interpreted to be that BSATs are included in shipments with other similar but different samples and whereas they are “hiding” in plain sight being “lost in the crowd” of other samples. Is that a secure manner to transport, handle and ensure the chain of custody uniquely, separately and explicitly or is that more bullshit vernacular to explain away robust biosecurity?

Is that a way to circumvent strict inventory and auditing controls that would be found in a robust biosecurity system – to just throw them in with the rest?

Interestingly, a precise definition for “in the crowd” could not be located so if the inference is wrong, I’ll happily walk that aspect back. I’m not wrong.

From the DoD report (emphasis mine),

Rather than steal BSAT from a DoD lab, other paths would appear preferable for an adversary (e.g., natural sources, non-DoD labs, non-U.S. labs, genomic synthesis) except possibly in the case of a blackmailed or disgruntled employee working from the inside. DoD should avoid those measures that are significantly detrimental to the laboratory mission, onerous, or detract from morale unless the measure significantly improves security or safety. Covert external threats are unlikely and layers of defensive measures serve to deter further. An external “attack” by a demonstration mob or explosives, coupled with inflammatory media, could panic the surrounding populace.

From the Recommendations section of the DoD report,

Monitoring Activities: Make minor changes to monitor activities in labs to improve effectiveness without introducing significantly obtrusive measures that are unwarranted by the threat.

Again, it’s the same sacrifice of robust biosecurity for vague and ambiguous descriptions proffered in Deep State vernacular.

With the Clintons deeply enmeshed and Hillary at State, consider this recommendation below permitting State to inherit the authority to conduct background investigations for foreign (China?) recipients of BSATs.

That’s the same Hillary Clinton that maintained a private and unsecured server in her personal residence to deliver SAPs and highly classified and protected intelligence to China/CCP/PLA. See the repeated pattern of tactics and specifically relative to China? Rhetorical question.

OCONUS Regulations: Issue a blanket waiver for use of Department of State background investigations (conducted by U.S. Embassy Regional Security Office), in place of National Agency Check with Local Agency Check and Credit (NACLC), among host country personnel working with BSATs in DoD labs outside the continental United States (OCONUS).

Below, the rubber begins to meet the road with the recommendation to dispatch the 2-person biosecurity system for BSAT shipments to DoD labs (smuggling could be a possible synonym.)

BSAT Transport: Review use of the two-person rule for BSAT shipments; threat is unlikely. Continue to use “lost in the crowd” approach used for the shipments involving DoD labs. As a future option, investigate potential of flight safe, tamper-resistant shipping containers.

The DoD report concludes its recommendations (emphasis mine),

In summary, the recommendations in these seven areas will enhance current bio-safety and bio-security operations at the DoD laboratories while minimizing the impact of regulatory processes on the missions of those laboratories. The cost of implementing these recommendations is believed to be modest, but should not be imposed on the research programs that affect the missions of the labs.

That gives the appearance of a fundamental redirection from the priority from operational biosecurity to operational mission objectives, does it not? In both instances above – operational biosecurity and cost – mission objectives are given the priority over biosecurity.

Would “missions” include gain of function research relative to the SARS-CoV-2 virus?

From the DoD report (emphasis mine).

With respect to monitoring lab work to detect nefarious activities, the task force concluded the following: The two-person rule for security has many disadvantages but may be effective in certain, limited circumstances, primarily for safety while working with highly pathogenic materials or laboratory animals. In the long run, costs associated with the two-person approach are excessive and the effectiveness for security is highly questionable. Surveillance with the two-person rule is not likely to be continuous over an extended period and a perpetrator can know when he is not being observed (the other person’s back is turned). (See Figure 1 for an example of a typical lab floor plan). In addition, most labs have very constrained working areas and the observer would not be in a position to continuously observe the worker. Video surveillance of the labs can be much more effective than the two-person rule if enhanced with better procedures, better tools for monitoring, longer retention of recordings, and management participation. In addition, it probably results in lower long-term cost. Video has the advantage of constant surveillance; the malefactor doesn’t know when he is being monitored or not. Data overload problem of video should be dealt with by spot checking and random supervisory audits, and with tools developed for that purpose. Video surveillance has potential cross-benefits in checking for adherence to safety procedures and should be seen by the staff as dominantly for that purpose Video recordings are usually kept for 30–45 days at most labs while others save them for up to a year. They should be kept longer.

Video monitoring of labs for security is preferred over the two-person rule and could be much more effective than it is today. The primary concern is the disgruntled or stressed employee and the combination of video monitoring and BPRP should be integrated to detect such individuals. In monitoring, whether by video or by a second person, the question is where the focus should be for detecting problems most effectively. The following are examples of possible unauthorized acts that would be indicative of malfeasance: intentional concealing of containers or vials transfer of BSAT containers through showers, locker areas, or air locks preparation of live, dried BSATs unauthorized personnel in restricted areas manipulation of unregistered or undocumented BSAT cultures or containers tampering with freezer, incubator, or pass-through window locks manipulating BSAT cultures outside of bio-safety cabinets or outside of approved labs conducting animal studies without an approved protocol manipulating BSATs without appropriate safety procedures or equipment inadequate decontamination or destruction of working BSAT cultures at study conclusion.

Is there any science backing the claims proffered in their slick vernacular? No, hence the need for slick vernacular.

More importantly, it’s the same bullshit dialogue detracting from the fact that the rules are being changed towards more lax biosecurity. Look here; not there.

The explanation is simple and about anyone can comprehend it. Given that these scientists are conducting research of the highest risk and consequences, policy should dictate that biocontainment facilities BE DOING ALL OF IT – taking all of the reasonable measures; not bickering about and selecting over the options.

Instead, though, they are using this detracting dialogue to reduce biosecurity measures and cleverly push it in the wrong direction.

Regarding individuals cleared to handle BSATs, the FBI conducts SRA background investigations on all individuals but moreover, in those security clearance considerations, the Secretary of State, who was Clinton at the time, bears down again with authority,

“…is an alien who is a national of a country as to which the Secretary of State has made a determination (that remains in effect) that such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”

Does China qualify by those terms? Factoring in Clinton’s State Department considerations, why did this report not mention China once? It mentioned countries in the Middle East but not China. It’s a small data point worth the mention.

The DoD report goes on to elaborate on the balance of the background investigations for BSAT handlers that go beyond the requisite FBI’s SRA and they can be consumed independently (linked below).

THE MONACO MEMO

We turn our attention to the 2014-2015 time frame and the Monaco memo.

Our source here is an 29 Oct 15 memorandum issued by the Obama White House and it’s complimented by an October 2015 report entitled Fast Track Action Committee Report: Recommendations on the Select Agent Regulations Based on Broad Stakeholder Engagement.

From the 29 Oct 15 memorandum, there is an attached “Tab A,” which contains an 18 Aug 14 memorandum co-issued by Lisa Monaco (Department of Homeland Security.) This memo advises all national labs/biocontainment facilities to conduct a “security stand down” within 30 days and curiously overlaps the 2014 Obama decision to end gain of function research in the U.S., as previously discussed. This would be followed by the 2015 off-shoring and funding (NIH) of gain of function (SARs-CoV-2?) research to the WIV in China.

Recall how they care to ship BSATs with the “lost in the crowd” approach?

Well, what if suddenly there were a biosecurity crisis because internal whistleblowers delivered revelations and shined the light on U.S. bio-warfare and gain of function research?

How could one manage that crisis without drawing attention to any one particular (or more) lab (scene(s) of the crime)?

Could one use the “lost in the crowd approach” to expand the crisis to all similar biocontainment facilities and therein attribute the reason to three unrelated cited incidents while also following through with the rules rewrite that began with the Bush EO; while at the same time compartmentalizing the fallout and damage by shutting it down and off-shoring it to China?

Could one do that essentially without losing a step and falling behind in the work?

The tactic is analogous to the concept of opening a federal investigation for the express purpose of vacuuming-up evidence to cover-up a crime rather than exposing the evidence and prosecuting the crime (defendants.)

I think that’s what they may have done here with the Monaco memo.

The Monaco memo further and conveniently includes directives for international collaboration and the use of multinational venues (venues would be labs.) Like labs in China?

The obvious million dollar question is whether the Monaco memo served as the false flag event to implement final biosecurity policy changes to loosen U.S. biosecurity systems and to permit the off-shoring of U.S. gain of function research (SARS-CoV-2?) to the WIV in China; while simultaneously concealing the evidence of it.

Following the Monaco Memo, we get the October 2015 Fast Track Action Committee Report: Recommendations on the Select Agent Regulations Based on Broad Stakeholder Engagement. That report continues to identify the same persisting biosecurity recommendations (problems.)

It will be important to weigh what was recommended v. what was considered but not recommended (or not not considered at all) (emphasis mine),

Gaps in the Select Agent RegulationsSome respondents believed that the potential risks posed by novel organisms and new techniques are significant and inadequately addressed by existing regulatory approaches. The rapid pace of advances in genetic engineering and molecular biology has lowered barriers to the ability of researchers to use recombinant technologies to potentially increase an organism’s virulence or synthesize a biological select agent de novo. The ability to translate biological data into digital form and back again raises questions about regulatory oversight measures, such as the SAR, that rely on the physical presence of a pathogen. It was argued that additional consideration should therefore be given to regulatory approaches that anticipate technological challenges and are flexible enough to keep pace with them.

As we consider the report’s Recommendations, we focus on items considered but omitted: 1) creating a uniform and robust federal biosecurity system (instead preferring to create a “task force” to further explore and make recommendations), 2) a second uniform federal system to vet personnel and determine personnel reliability (background investigations and clearances) and 3) constructing a direct safety and oversight program for bio-WMD and gain of function research specifically.

As for keeping the human element in tact – otherwise known as the barrier to fraud and more specifically as the 2-person bio-security measure – the report only mentioned it once buried in a section entitled “Summary Comments from Listening Sessions” in the sub-section “Gaps in the Overarching SAR Approach or Process.” Little of value was said.

BUSH EXECUTIVE ORDER 13486

Now, take what we know and apply it to the timeline presented below. We do this remembering that on 09 Jan 09, eleven days before his exit and Obama’s entry, George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13486, which,

“…established a Working Group (WG) co-chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or their designees. Other members of the WG included designees of the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Directors of National Intelligence and the National Science Foundation, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Attorney General.”

That objective was to strengthen U.S. laboratory biosecurity.

What it really did was permit the incoming Obama administration the requisite mechanism to revamp U.S. biosecurity, which permitted the necessary and eventual 2015 off-shoring of GOF research to China.

Note a common theme occurring in statecraft where something specific will transit multiple presidential administrations. In these cases, there are tendencies for an outgoing president to function by executive order for the purpose of setting-up the incoming administration for particular vectors of work. This is a passive tactic to conceal evidence and attribution and divide the work to avoid having a single fall guy ergo it permits easier hand washing and deniability.

Building on the aforementioned executive order, consider this broader timeline relative our established fact set and U.S. biosecurity more broadly.

This timeline information is exclusively sourced with (my emphasis) added,

1996: The select agent program launched by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which prohibited the transfer of some “select” agents from one laboratory to another without registration with the CDC

2001: Anthrax letter attacks expose “a gap” in biosecurity.

2003: The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, along with the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, led to a new select agent program (ushered in by 9/11?).

2003: In October 2003, the National Research Council published Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, which is known as the Fink Report. The com­mittee described an initial set of seven types of experiments of concern that, while not prohibited, would merit review and discussion before being under­taken or published in detail.

2004: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was established in 2004 as a federal advisory committee and has been chartered continuously to date at two-year intervals by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The NSABB has offered guidance for handling dual-use re­search of concern (DURC), a modified form of the Fink Report’s experiments of concern, and has provided input on the publication of several papers in ad­dition to the H5N1 papers, including one on the reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus, for which they recommended publication.

2008: World at Risk, the report of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (WMD Commission), was released on December 2, 2008. In the report, the WMD Commission rec­ommended that the U.S. should “conduct a comprehensive review of the do­mestic program to secure dangerous pathogens, tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories and promote a culture of security awareness in the life sciences community.”

2009: Working Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States report re­leased on October 23, 2009; established by Executive Order 13486, which was signed on January 9, 2009, by George W. Bush.

2009: National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) Report: Enhancing Personnel Reliability among Individuals with Access to Select Agents released April 30, 2009

2009: The Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment Oversight, co-chaired by HHS and USDA, released a report that examined gaps in the oversight framework for laboratories and options for improvement to biocontainment oversight. Among its recommendations: there should be training standards and core competencies for personnel at high and maxi­mum containment research laboratories, and there should be a phased-in re­quirement for credentialing of biosafety professionals at high and maximum containment laboratories.

2009: Defense Science Board task force report Biological Safety and Security Program for Research Involving Biological Select Agents and Toxins publicly released May, 2009. They identi­fied areas for action, including computer security enhancements such as video monitoring of laboratory workers, which they determined to be superior to the “two-person rule,” transporting pathogens with a “lost in the crowd” approach vs. a two-person escort; and avoiding security measures that are significantly detrimental to the mission, particularly for overseas laboratories.

2009: Government Accountability Organization (GAO) report High Containment Laboratories: Issues related to Oversight released in September 2009.

2009: National Research Council (National Academy of Sciences) report Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins Released.

2009: National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats released November 2009. The strategy includes a series of objectives that are intended to “protect against the misuse of the life sciences to develop or use biological agents to cause harm.”

2010: Executive Order 13546, Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States, was released on July 2, 2010. The EO stated that there was an “absence of clearly defined, risk-based security measures” for the select agent program, which “has raised concern about the need for optimized security and for risk management.”

2011: On June 13, 2011, the federal experts security advisory panel released Recommendations Concerning the Select Agent Program, as called for in EO 13546. It created a tier 1 of pathogens and recommended that 25 pathogens be removed from the select agent list. The panel also recommended the removal of a number of animal and human pathogens from the select agents list and recommended against the inclusion of SARS.

OBAMA EXECUTIVE ORDER 13546

On 02 July 10, Obama issued EO 13546 and on 13 Jul 11, as noted in the timeline above, federal experts were responsive to it with their report entitled ‘Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel Recommendations Concerning the Select Agent Program.’

Buried at the bottom of this report are two footnotes (emphasis mine).

The first footnote reads, “Revised 1/10/11: Recommendation regarding inclusion of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus on the list of BSAT.”

The second footnote provides an enormous plot shift in this drama and it reads, “The FESAP does not recommend inclusion of SARS on the list of BSAT.”

That’s right. After all of the designed uncertainty and years of discourse, committees, indecisiveness, lack of clarity, bullshit vernacular and more; and all over biosecurity and the bickering over which systems and guardrails are best, rather than combining them all into one comprehensive and robust biosecurity system, Obama’s executive order took the additional step of recommending the removal of SARS from the BSAT list.

Does that equate to a deliberate maneuver to avert active surveillance on gain of function research on SARS and does that include SARS-CoV-2?

Here’s a reminder about SARS: the entire COVID-19 pandemic is a fraudulent construct resting on a platform of propagated infection and mortality from SARS-CoV-2; the same SARS Obama sought to have removed.

I believe we’ve uncovered the broader basis – and the cover-up mechanism – for the ending of gain of function research in the U.S., its off-shoring and funding to China and as attributable on a timeline extending from George H.W. Bush through Joe Biden and with Anthony Fauci as the bridge linking them all start to finish.

No wonder Joe Biden shut down the investigation into the genesis of COVID-19.

If the rules are inconvenient, just change them.

-End-

SOURCES: ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN EIGHT NINE TEN ELEVEN

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14 Thoughts to “Dangerously Changing Inconvenient Rules”

  1. Great perspective

    1. Willett Amie

      Q Post #278

      “We said NO”.
      Please tell this still applies.

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